Unclear Thinking about Philosophical Zombies and Quantum Measurement
Two Temptations That Derail Clear Thinking
1) Smuggling consciousness into quantum mechanics
A common mistake is to treat the quantum measurement problem as if it required a conscious observer. It doesn’t. The problem, stated briefly, is that Schrödinger’s equation predicts smooth, unitary evolution, yet laboratory “measurements” deliver single, definite outcomes. How we reconcile these is a live technical and philosophical question—but the mainstream ways of doing so do not invoke consciousness [1]. Decoherence theory, for example, explains the emergence of robust, classical-looking outcomes through environment-induced suppression of interference; it narrows what needs explaining without positing minds in the dynamics [3]. And across the best-known interpretations—Everett (many‑worlds), Bohmian mechanics, GRW-style objective collapse, consistent histories, QBism—the formal role is played by measuring devices or macroscopic interactions, not by sentient minds causing collapses. When researchers were explicitly asked whether the observer plays a special physical role (e.g., “collapse by consciousness”), only about 6% said yes; most said the observer should play no special physical role or only a pragmatic role in applying the formalism [2]. Treating “consciousness causes collapse” as if it were the default is therefore cherry‑picking an outlier view. [1][2][3]
2) Letting philosophical zombies do more work than they can
Another recurring error is to claim that the philosopher’s zombie (a behavioral and physical duplicate of a human without experience) refutes materialism. The zombie argument is deeply contested; many philosophers hold that zombies are not even conceivable in the relevant sense, or that conceivability doesn’t show metaphysical possibility [4]. More importantly for scientific theorizing, most leading research programs in consciousness render “p‑zombies” incoherent on their own terms. Functionalism identifies mental states by their causal roles; by definition, a system identical in structure and causal powers would have the same mental states—it wouldn’t be a zombie [5]. Global Neuronal Workspace theory likewise treats conscious access as information becoming globally available across long‑range cortical networks; duplicate the causal‑computational organization, and you duplicate the conscious access [6]. Integrated Information Theory equates consciousness with the system’s intrinsic causal structure (its Φ); two systems with the same causal structure have the same Φ—and thus the same consciousness [7]. Higher‑order theories ground consciousness in higher‑order representations; again, a causal duplicate would instantiate them [8]. Claiming zombies defeat “materialism” while leaning on isolated or nonfunctional theories is, again, an instance of cherry‑picking. [4][5][6][7][8]
A meta‑error that feeds both
In both debates, people often implicitly pick their favorite framework and then argue as if it were settled fact. But neither quantum foundations nor consciousness science has reached a consensus. Surveys of experts in quantum foundations show a wide spread of commitments across interpretations, with only a small minority endorsing consciousness‑driven collapse [2]. On the neuroscience side, recent adversarial collaborations pitting Global Neuronal Workspace against Integrated Information Theory produced mixed results—confirming some predictions and challenging others—without a decisive “winner.” That is exactly what an unsettled field looks like, and it’s a reason to keep our arguments interpretation‑explicit rather than interpretation‑smuggled [9][10].
A better habit
When your reasoning depends on a controversial assumption, say so. If you want to reason “within Everett” about quantum puzzles, state that you’re working in Everett. If you want to assess a thought experiment from within a functionalist (or IIT, or GNW) account of consciousness, say which one. Then ask whether your conclusion is robust across rival frameworks—or whether it hangs on a narrow, low‑consensus assumption. That’s clear thinking.
Notes / References
[1] W. Myrvold, “Philosophical Issues in Quantum Theory,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (rev. 2022). (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
[2] M. Schlosshauer, J. Kofler, A. Zeilinger, “A Snapshot of Foundational Attitudes Toward Quantum Mechanics,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 44 (2013): 222–230. (Q10: only ~6% endorse a consciousness‑caused collapse.) (ar5iv)
[3] M. Schlosshauer, “Decoherence, the measurement problem, and interpretations of quantum mechanics,” Rev. Mod. Phys. 76 (2005): 1267–1305. (Physical Review)
[4] R. Kirk, “Zombies,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (rev. 2019 & later updates). (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
[5] J. Levin, “Functionalism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (rev. 2018+). (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
[6] G. A. Mashour, P. Roelfsema, J.-P. Changeux, S. Dehaene, “Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis,” Neuron 105 (2020): 776–798. (Open‑access author manuscript.) (PubMed Central)
[7] G. Tononi, M. Boly, M. Massimini, C. Koch, “Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate,” Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 17 (2016): 450–461. (PubMed)
[8] P. Carruthers, “Higher‑Order Theories of Consciousness,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (rev. 2018+). (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
[9] Cogitate Consortium et al., “Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness,” Nature (2025): reports mixed results that challenge predictions of both GNWT and IIT. (Nature)
[10] L. Melloni et al., “An adversarial collaboration protocol for testing contrasting predictions of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theory,” PLOS ONE 18 (2023): e0268577. (PLOS)
Endnotes on scope. Interpretations of quantum theory referenced in §1 include many‑worlds, Bohmian mechanics, GRW collapse, consistent histories, and QBism; none of these require “consciousness causes collapse.” See SEP overviews and primary sources cited in [1] and [2], and the literature on decoherence in [3]. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ar5iv, Physical Review)